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political and military elites…
(Photo credit:  Wikimedia Commons, by Peter Fitzgerald, amendments by LtPowers, own
work, CC-BY-SA 3.0).
*****
Civil-Military Imbalance in the Sahel
 
In less than a year, the Sahel region has experienced two coups, one coup attempt and
something that now looks like a ‘
’, �rmly putting civil-military relations
at the top of the agenda for understanding the current context of power competition between
political and military elites.
In democratic states, the imperative to ‘guard the guardians’ is the basis for civil-military
relations. 
 to the people
while military of�cers have a responsibility to abide by the civilians, and to advise, yet not
impose, their views on those civilians. That is the basis of democratic theory, which has been
institutionalized and taught to militaries across the world. A theory which nonetheless
increasingly has been put to test in 
 over the past few years.
In fragile democracies, such as Mali, Niger and Chad, where the societal unity and
administrative ability to maintain a functioning state are lacking, and where armed groups
entertain a violent status quo, calls for security and 
give the security forces a central role. This central role is strengthened by 
, which train and equip the armed forces to combat violent non-state actors in an
effort to reinforce state authority. While the premises of civilian oversight and accountability
most often are part of such training, such principles have 
coup within a coup (https://www.trtworld.com/magazine
/what-prompted-a-coup-within-a-coup-in-mali-46996)
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 in a context where state
of�cials are incapable or unwilling of providing a democratic framework to implement
oversight and promote accountability, or when it is de facto military rule.
In all three states which have experienced coups and coup attempts over the past year, the
military has historically been closely intertwined with politics. Niger, which experienced a
 following the Presidential elections earlier this year, has a history of three
coups over the past three decades. The country has spent 22 years of its 60 years as an
independent state under military rule, giving an indication of the military’s in�uence in
domestic politics. Yet, the fact that the past two coups (in 1999 and 2010), were so-called
 – meaning that the coup
makers handed over power to democratically elected leaders relatively soon after the
putsches –  in combination with a relatively 
 by the Nigerien armed
forces in comparison to its regional homologues, has given the Nigerien security forces a
slightly better reputation than their neighboring colleagues. That reputation is however
vanishing quickly, as 
 by Nigerien army units surfaced in 2020.
In Chad, a state where 
, the military has maintained a key role in a history
of rebellions and suppressions under a ‘warrior president’ �rmly supported by its 
. The late Idriss Déby, who stayed in power over three decades, was by
all accounts an excellent strategist who managed to make sure that the Chadian military
became a regional and international tool in the �ght against terrorists and criminal networks.
He thereby avoided repercussions for a deeply personalized dictatorship and multiple human
rights abuses conducted against civilians, both home and abroad.
Chadian forces contribute most troops to the UN mission in Mali, often deployed to the 
, whereas they are in the lead for the G5 Sahel Joint Force for
counter-terrorism and a valuable support to France in Barkhane. Fighting against Boko
Haram in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF), Chad has also acquired support from
other Western powers, thus rendering itself an 
 and a
american-security-force-assistance-right-political-context-matters/)
feeble coup attempt (https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210331-attempted-coup-
in-niger-france-24)
‘corrective coups’ (https://www.jstor.org/stable/41240194?seq=1)




reports of mass executions (https://www.dw.com/en/niger-fear-of-
terror-and-the-military/a-54947989)




colonial power France (https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/24/france-macron-chad-deby-
democracy-g5-sahel/)
most




strategic asset in the Sahel (https://www.theafricareport.com/89399/chad-president-deby-
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. Not surprisingly
therefore, the recent unconstitutional move, whereby Déby’s son Mahamat Déby 
 and took the lead of a
Transitional Military Council following his father’s death at the hands of rebels in April this
year, did not face any regional or international repercussions, but rather support for status
quo. Mahamat’s lightning career development as a 37-year old four-star general also re�ects
the heavy politicization of the military and personalization of the state. It does not seem far-
fetched to view Chad as an example of a 
, where the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society.
Overall, the civil-military balance is not just super�cial in Chad, it is illusionary.
Mali, which has been the epicenter of the overlapping Sahelian crises over the past decade,
has experienced one coup and what looks like a ‘coup within a coup’, within 9 months. These
coups can be added to the earlier three in 1968, 1991 and 2012, the latter which prompted a
heavy international response. Such a history of coups suggests a signi�cant militarization of
politics, where military members remain central political �gures even during periods of
civilian rule. The international focus on 
 and
stability has inevitably reinforced the local security forces’ standing in Mali, in spite of their
poor reputation, as they remain the primary tool through which such stability is to be
achieved. Recent decades’ emphasis on the security-development nexus has also prompted a
 by recipient states, such as Mali, in the interest of attracting
external security assistance.
The past year’s military coups in the Sahel have thus underlined the profound imbalance in
civil-military relations in the region and raised questions regarding security force assistance
to fragile states more broadly. These questions are particularly timely as the EU is set to
launch its much-debated European Peace Facility, an off-budget �nancial instrument which
will allow EU to fund military training, equipment, and infrastructure in partner countries for
the �rst time in history. There is clearly a 
 to, and improving the capacity of, security forces
which recently have been involved in military coups and human rights abuses. There is also an
important difference in the type of training and equipment that is delivered. Providing �rst-
aid kits and training troops in judicialization does not entail the same consequences as
contributing with weapons and improving armed forces’ combat ef�ciency.










securitization of underdevelopment and poverty (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs
/10.1177/0967010617742243)
case to be made against providing lethal equipment
(https://www.ft.com/content/dd29eb4d-1fc0-4123-
ada1-290c4c63d966?shareType=nongift)
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training at all is not an easy solution, as although it decreases external partners’ responsibility
for local forces’ transgressions, it also removes any 
 on the local militaries. Critics may claim that
whatever in�uence external partners have had so far, it clearly has not been suf�cient to
prevent forces from conducting coups or even to limit abuse against the civilian populations.
However, it is also possible to imagine that the situation would have been different without
external training and assistance, leaving more space for non-state armed actors to commit
attacks and even less control over local forces’ behavior. Western states are also uneasy
about leaving a gap when it comes to security assistance, as there is a risk that it is �lled by
other actors such as 
 in the region, and who have less scruples regarding
democratic norms and civil-military balance.
The recent coups in the Sahel region exemplify the lack of a civil-military balance whereby the
armed forces are both under substantial civilian oversight and capable of national defense.
Fragile and divided states which fail to deliver basic services to their populations, are by their
very nature more prone to instability and coups. In a crisis context where security and
stabilization become priorities, the armed forces are likely to further strengthen their upper
hand, especially with external support. International and national authorities which demand
military expertise to �ght armed groups and strengthen national security ‘pull’ the armed
forces further into politics, while the latter exploit their advantage over civilian authorities to
‘
. Building on a history whereby the military has consistently been
heavily involved in politics, the current context in the Sahel evokes 
: Why is military intervention in politics
or military government the exception, rather than the rule? The present answer to that
question may unfortunately be that right now, it is more of a rule than an exception.
The author is grateful for useful comments by Marco Jowell and Andrew Lebovich.
Prof. Dr. Nina Wilén, Director of the Africa Programme at Egmont Institute and Associate
Professor at Lund University is also a Global Fellow at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo
(PRIO).





Russia or China who are keen to have an in�uence
(https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/642232
/EPRS_BRI(2019)642232_EN.pdf)
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